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O
ne of the most provocative developments in
the u.s. economy during the 191)0s was the
rapid increase in net foreign claims on U.S. assets,
\vith its counterpart in a large domestic trade
deficit. To som(:" observers. the heightened pace
of foreign acquisition of u.s. assets was clear
evidence of an improved investment climate and
so should be regarded as a sign of strength To
others, however, the foreign capital intlows were
the result of a broad-based consumptipn binge.
By drawing dO\vn wealth to support present
spending levels. u.s. residents were compromis-
ing their future living standards.
In an article in the September 191)9 issue
of t:col1omic Reuiell', I argued that a substantial
portion of the foreign capital inflows could be
explained by U.S demographics. During the
191)0s, the baby boom generation created large
inv(:"stment demands, yet off(:"red little saving to
finance them. This behavior was norma!. given
th(:" age of the cohort, however, and so the result-
ing foreign capital inflows held little significance
for future U S living standards, one way or the
other. As members of the baby boom aged, saving
would rise. domestic investment would drop, and
the United States would switch from being an
importer to a net exporter of capital. My calcula-
tions showed th~1t projected shifts in the age
distribution of U.S. households were significant
enough to raise net capital outflows to 3 percent
of gross national product (GNP) by the year 2010.
A principal assumption in my earlier analysis
was that rising U.S. capital outflmvs could be
absorbed by the rest of the world without a
decline in interest rates In this article, I consider
the reasonableness of this assumption and re-
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evaluate the accuracy of my earlier projections.
First. I look at the other major industrialized
countries to see if their demographics would
support a rapid turnaround in the U.S. capital
account. The results are decidedly negative.
Although the U.S. population will age significantly
over the next several decades, so will the popula-
tions of other major trading nations. This coinci-
dence in aging serves to postpone the date of
improvement in the u.s. foreign investment
position. A simulation of patterns of capital flow
based on demographic conditions in the United
States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom
suggests that the U.S. could remain a net importer
of capiral throughout the 1990s and into the early
part of the next century.
This analysis probably represents an extreme
among possible outcomes since other factors
affecting the world capital market over the next
few decades are likely to support rather th:m
depress interest rates. I believe two to be espe-
cially important: (l) a more complete integration
of developing countries into the world capital
market and (2) the transformation of centrally
planned economies into market economies. The
United States is a young nation by the standards
of the major industrialized countries, but it is old
This article has benefitedfrom comments andadvicegiven
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23relative to the less-developed world. If, through
internal reforms, countries such as Mexico and
Argentina can gain broader participation in the
world capital market, their demographics will lead
them to draw capital from the United States and
other developed countries.
A second factor that may significantly raise
world investment demand over the next few
decades is the economic liberalization of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. Because of
technological isolation and distorted incentive
structures, a huge fraction of the capital stock in
these countries is outmoded and will have to be
modernized or replaced. The effects could be
dramatic. In a simulated reconstruction of Eastern
Europe, where the domestic capital stock is
effectively doubled over the next ten years, I find
that U.S. capital flows rise from -1 percent of GNP
at the end of the 1980s to 1 percent of GNP by
the end of the century. The consequences of a
recapitalization of the former Soviet Union could
be far greater.
After weighing these alternative considera-
tions, I remain in general agreement with my
earlier conclusion: with the aging of the baby
boom generation, the United States is likely to
become a major capital exporter by the end of
this decade and throughout the early P~lIt of the
next century. This course of events is not a given,
however Indeed, it is incompatible with the
economic environment of the 1980s, where inter-
national capital flows were confined largely to
2 The data for this article refer to West Germany before
unification with East Germany
3 Interestingly, the simulations indicate that US capital in-
flows should have been as large during the 1970s as they
were during the 1980s Officialestimates, on the otherhand,
date the declinein U S netforeign assets to the early 1980s
This disparity between the simulated andmeasured series
adds a new perspective to the debate on the origin ofUS
foreign indebtedness Traditional analysis has emphasized
the emergenceoffactors during the 1980s, suchas the U 5
federal bUdget deficit, that drew foreign capital into the
UnitedStates Itmaybe equallyimportant, however, to look
for a cessation offactors that hadrestrained capital inflows
during the 1970s Most important in this regard maybe the
dismantling of capital controls by Japan and other major
countries
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major Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries. But the capital
market of the future is likely to contain many new
players, especially a number of developing and
newly liberalized countries. The new participants
will be net borrowers of capital and so will support
the turnaround in the U.S. capital account that is
called for by the aging of the U.S. population.
Demographics and capital flows
within OEeD countries
A limitation of the analysis in my earlier paper
is that the effects of U.S demographics on U.S.
capital outflows were evaluated in a vacuum,
without reference to demographic conditions in
other trading countries. In this section, I look
simultaneously at the demography of four major
industrialized countries: the United States, Japan,
Germany,2 and the United Kingdom. These are
among the largest of the developed countries, and
their demographic characteristics are varied enough
to be representative of all OECD countries.
The analysis here is based on numerical
solutions of an overlapping generations model
similar to the one I used in my earlier paper. The
model is briet1y described in the box titled "The
Simulation Model." The simulations evaluate the
effect of comparative demographics on the net
external asset position of each country for each
year from 1970 to 2010. Demographic differences
highlighted in the model relate to historical
variations in the size of successive birth cohorts.
The analysis ignores any variation in life expect-
ancy or patterns of household formation.
The results for the decade of the 1980s are
very similar to those I found in my earlier work.
When demographic conditions in the four countries
are considered together, the United States remains
a net capital importer, with a current account deficit
averaging 1 percent of GNP each year throughout
the decade. The dominant capital-exporting
country is Japan, with annual outflows averaging
3 percent of its GNP. The United States is a net
recipient of foreign capital not because its savings
rate is low by international standards, but because
its investment rate is relatively high. The high rate
of domestic investment over this period reflects
the entry of the baby boom generation into the
U.S. work force,"
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Figure A
Life-Cycle Profiles of Household Wealth
and Required Capital







the life-cycle model is that it overstates the
rate at which households draw down their
wealth late in life. For some countries, the
share ofthe elderly in the domesticpopulation
changes significantly over the period of our
analysis. As I will note later, however, the
direction of the bias is clear, and it reinforces
the conclusions of the analysis.
Capital formation. Each country produces a
single, nondepreciating good using labor and
the good itself (capital). There are no adjust-
ment costs in capital formation. The capital
stock in acountry depends on its labor supply
and current factor prices.
NOTE: With a world capital market, relative demographics
determine the international investment position of a
country Young countries become net debtors because
the capital required to support their work forces
exceeds the accumulated wealth of their residents.
Conversely, old countries become creditors to the rest
of the world
The model is designed not to replicate
history or to forecast, but to evaluate the
partial effect of demographic conditions on
world capital flows. Households have identi-
cal preferences for consumption over time
and identical life-cycle patterns of labor sup-
ply. Countries produce a single good using a
common technology. Simulated movements
in the external asset position of a country are
entirely the result of relative shifts in popula-
tion age mix.
Wealth accumulation. Households are
formed bytwo adults of age 21. Each member
hasafixed and known life expectancy. House-
holdsaccumulatewealth accordingto the life-
cycle theory. Each maximizes a lifetime utility
function containing two parameters: an elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution and a pure
rate of time preference. Following recent lit-
erature, I set the elasticity of substitution at a
low value. The utility function also contains
periodicweights reflecting family needs. These
weights are defined by combining age-spe-
cific consumption weights with an assumed
life-cycle pattern of family size and age com-
position.
Households begin their lives with no
wealth, and they leave no bequests. They
borrow and lend at a single rate of interest on
the basis of their current and future labor
income. Household laborsupply is exogenous
but is defined to reflect age-related variations
in laborforce participation and workerproduc-
tivity.
Figure A shows an optimal wealth pro-
file for a given wage and interest rate. The
profile hasthe traditional humpshape, reflect-
ing apattern ofaccumulation during the work-
ing years followed by a reduction in wealth
during retirement. The principal limitation of
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All types of labor are perfect substi-
tutes, but the efficiency of an individual's
labor varies with age. The assumed effects
of age on male productivity are based on
studies of age-earnings profiles of U.S. men
with college experience. Earnings for female
workers are assumed to be independent of
age and 1.3 times the earnings of an entry-
level male worker.
Each household generates a demand
for capital that is proportional to its labor
supply. Figure A shows the relationship be-
tween age and required capital for a given
wage and interest rate. The shape of the
profile during the first half of the life cycle
reflects gains in the productivity of the male
worker and changes in the rate of female
labor force participation associated with child
rearing. Effective household labor supply
peaks when adults are in their early forties.
After that, labor supply begins to decline-
slowly at first, tracking the decline in worker
productivity, and then more rapidly as labor
force participation falls.
Equilibrium. The real interest rate adjusts to
ensure that aggregate wealth at the begin-
ning of a year is just sufficient to finance
aggregate capital requirements for that year.
The net foreign asset position of a country is
determined by the relative age mix of its
population. Individual household wealth, w,
depends on age, a, and the interest rate, r, but
not on country of origin. The implied capital
requirement of a household, k, is also inde-
pendent of its country of origin, varying only
with age and the rate of interest. In equilib-
rium, therefore, net foreign assets per house-
hold in a given country can be written as
NFA = I,[p(a)-p *(a)][w(a,r)- k(a,r)],
a
where p(a) is the fraction of the country's
household population ofage a and p*(a) is the
corresponding fraction for the world. Differ-
ences in age mix provide the only basis for
international exchange. The net external
asset position of an individual household
rises monotonicallywith age. Thus, countries
with young populations become net interna-
tional debtors. Their net foreign asset posi-
tions increase as they age relative to the rest
of the world.
Demographic data. The model requires in-
formation on the number of households living
in each country during the period 1970-2010.
To measurethe householdsformed in agiven
country in year t, I divide by 2 the number of
individuals who were of age 37 (the median
age of the statistical age bracket 35-39) and
residing in the country during year (t+16).
Individuals are counted in their late thirties as
a crude adjustment for immigration. Popula-
tion projectionsaredrawn from official sources.
Because the period of analysis ends with the
year 2010, relevant birth rates are known,
leaving immigration as the major source of
uncertainty in the projections.
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Simulated Rates of U.S. Saving, Investment, and Capital Outflow, 1990-2009
Average of Annual Rates
(percent)
Macroeconomic Aggregate 1990-94 1995-99 200Q-04 2005-09
Constant World Interest Rate"
Saving/GNP 3.9 4.4 5.4 6.0
(3.9) (3.7) (3.7) (3.5)
Investment/GNP 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.0
(2.5) (1.7) (.9) (.2)
Capital Outflow/GNP 0 .9 2.4 4.0
(1.4) (2.0) (2.8) (3.3)
Declining World Interest Rateb
Saving/GNP 3.9 4.3 5.3 5.8
(3.9) (3.6) (3.6) (3.3)
Investment/GNP 5.3 5.5 5.9 5.3
(3.9) (3.6) (3.6) (3.3)
Capital Outflow/GNP -1.4 -1.2 -.6 .5
(0) (0) (0) (0)
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are macro aggregates for a collective group consisting of the United States, Japan, the former West
Germany, and the United Kingdom
'Interest rate held constant at its market-clearing value in 1989
"Interest rate adjusted each year so that capital flows among the four major countries net to zero
Projccted capit:tl flows for the next two
dccldcs differ greatly. depending on v,,'hether inter-
est r~lll's arc assuilled constant or are adjusted until
Ilow.~ al110ng the four major countries net to zero,
The two cases are contrasted in Tahle I ~lIld Figures
1A ~\Ild lB. \Vith a constant interest rate, del11o-
gr~lphic shifts within the C S population produce
()\'l'!' thL' IXTim! 1990-2009 a 2-percentage-point rise
in tlK' s~I\'ings rate and a 2-percentage-point declil1L'
in the rate of inn.'stl11ent. as shO\\'n in Tahle I.
Accordingh'. l '.S. capital outf10\\'s rise hy I per-
centage points ofG'\P. This is a repetition of the
dr~IIll~llic projections contained in my l'arlil'l' a11icle.
At ~I consUnt interest rate. the United St~ltl'.~
\\ ou\(! secK to reduce its external deht. But the
()tlwr m~ljor countries \\ ould \vish to rem~lin clpit~t1
exporters. as indicated in figure IB. TIll' result is
~I clpiul glut. \vith aggregate ~vealth exn..eding
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~lggregalL'capital demand hy more than 10 percent
hy 2010.' Interest rates must fall to equalize capital
nows among the countries. Investment spending
is suhstantially more interest elastic than saving,
so the hulk of the disequilibrium adjustment falls
on investment For the C'nited States, the positive
effect on investment from a falling interest rate
offsets the negative effect of slower lahor force
gro\\-th. Any reduction in the rate of capital inflow
, The size ofthe surplus is probably understated For Japan
and Germany. the share ofthe population age 65 and over
is projected to rise significantly throughout the 1990s and
2000s Given thatthe life-cycle modeloverslates the rate of
dissaving among the elderly. the savings overhang is likely
to be even larger than my analysis suggests
27Figure 1A
Projected Net Capital Outflow of the
United States: Constant vs. Declining
World Interest Rate









Projected Net Capital Outflow of Other
Selected Industrialized Countries:
Constant vs. Declining World Interest Rate
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t Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively.
NOTE: With a constant world interest rate, the United States moves steadily toward becoming a large net exporter of capital by the early part of the
next century Other major industrialized countries wish to remain capital exporters, however Without external investment opportunities to
accommodate these capital outflows, interest rates must fall The drop in rates would stimulate investment spending around the world and
delay the date of improvement in the U S international investment position
occurs because of an increase in the savings rate.
U.S. net foreign assets continue to decline
throughout the 1990s and on into the next
century.
The basic reason for these results is as follows
The u.s. population will age significantly over the
next two decades, ret1ecting the aging of the large
baby boom cohort. By itself, this aging would
produce a substantial rise in the U.S. foreign
investment position. However, the populations of
other major industrialized countries will also age
over this period On balance, the u.S.-world
median age differential will rise only moderately.
The implication is that any increase in U.S. net
foreign assets will be much smaller than a partial
analysis of u.s. demographic trends would suggest.
The demographic forces behind this analysis are
clear and decisive, so the conclusions are robust
with respect to both alternative parameter values
in my own analysis and alternative modeling
approaches (Cutler et al., 1990, and Masson and
Tryon, 1990).
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Demographics in developing countries
One of the salient trends in the international
economy in the past fifteen years has been a move
toward greater integration of national capital
markets. especially among OECD countries. If this
trend continues, the analysis of the previous section
may itself be t1awed by its omission of new par-
ticipants in the world capital market. Figure 2
indicates how the results of the previous analysis
would change. Relative to other developed coun-
tries. the United States is a young nation. If capital
t10ws are largely confined to developed countries,
the United States will tend to be a net debtor
nation. The median age of the u.s. population is
high, however, in relation to the less-developed
world. The difference is moderate but significant
when comparing the United States with the fast-
growing East Asian countries, such as Hong Kong
and Singapore. The age differential is dramatic,
however, in the case of Mexico and other Latin
American countries. The message, then, is clear. If
Federal Reserve BankofDallasthe process of capital market integration continues
so as to include Illany of the developing countries,
demographic forces will serve to support interest
r~ltes and raise the international investml'nt
positions of tlK' major industrialized countries,
including the United States.
Capitaldemands from newly
liberalizedcountries
Demogr~lphyis not, of course, thl' only factor
th~lt \vill Jffeet world capital [lows in coming
decades Of particular recent interest are historic
economic reforms in Eastl'rn Europe. To gauge the
potential significance of these reforms, I used the
model to simulate the effect of an economic recon-
struction of Eastern Europe ror purposes of simu-
lation, I created a countlY group that, relative to
the collective population of the four major indus-
trialized countries, hJS an identical age mix hut is
only one fourth the size to rd1cct the relative sizl'
of the six newly liberalized countries of Bulgaria.
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,
and Rumania To simulate n:construction, I
assume that the capital stock of the countlY group
Figure 3
Simulated Effect of Economic Reconstruction
in Eastern Europe on U.S. Net Capital Outflow






NOTE: Economic reforms in centrally planned or less-developed
market economies can have a significant effect on the U S
capital account Here, reforms that succeed in doubling the
East European capital stock over a ten-year period raise U S.
net capital outflows by 1 percent to 2 percent of U S. GNP.
Figure 2
Median Age of Population in 1990 for Selected
























Median age, in years
at the beginning of 1990 is only one-half as large
as would be optimal, given the size of its labor
force and the prevailing world interest rate. Recon-
struction consists of a capital deepening that takes
place at a uniform rate over a ten-year period
until the year 2000, when capital-labor ratios are
equalized
The effects of the reconstruction are shown
in Figure 3. A net demand for capital by East
European countries serves to limit the decline in
world interest rates. U.S. capital flows move from
a deficit in excess of 1 percent of GNP at the end
of the 19110s to a surplus of neJ.rly 1 percent of
GNP by the end of the centlllY. Without additional
stimulus, the U S. current account then falls hack
into deficit. By that time, however, the former
Soviet Union may be in a position to host foreign
investment, with potentially greater consequences
for world capital flows.
NOTE: II inlernational borrowing and lending are limited to the
developed world, then demographic lorces push the United
States toward being a debtor nation. The United States is more
likely to be a net creditor if developing countries can become
more thoroughly integrated into the world capital market.
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Does it matter?
A principal lesson of the analysis in my
earlier paper was that demographic shifts can
2produce large changes in capital flows and other
macroeconomic aggregates that have very little
consequence for living standards. So long as
households plan over their life cycle, does it really
matter whether the U.S. international investment
position begins to improve this year or in ten
years' time? There are at least two reasons for
believing that it does.
First, a world capital glut would make it
more difficult for members of the U.S. baby boom
to prepare for retirement, adding to whatever
30
burden recent fiscal policy may have left them.
Even more threatening, however, is the possibility
of rising protectionist pressures should the u.s.
trade balance remain in deficit for another ten
years. In this light, recent economic reforms in
Communist nations and in some Latin American
nations, such as Mexico and Chile, take on added
significance. Through their effect on world capital
markets, these reforms may promote equity across
generations of U.S. citizens and help to preserve
free international commerce and exchange.
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